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In this paper, we consider the eﬀects of population aging on economic growth and the environment
in an overlapping generations model. It is often suggested that aging is harmful for economic
growth and the environment since the old people dissave and decrease investment in capital and
the environment. On the other hand, it is also suggested that aging is beneﬁcial for economic
growth and the environment since the young people invest more in capital and the environment
in preparation for their longer lifetimes. Focusing on an aging population is therefore important
for analyzing whether we can obtain a sustainable level of development in the future.
There are many studies that analyze economic growth or the environment in overlapping
generations models.1 To the best of our knowledge, there is none which examines the link
between sustainable development and population aging. In this paper, we aim to consider this
link.2
To pursue our goals, we utilize the overlapping generations model of growth and the en-
vironment by Pecchenino and Pollard (1997), and extend it by incorporating environmental
externalities along the line of John and Pecchenino (1994) and John et al. (1995). A negative
aspect of the eﬀect of aging on growth and the environment is captured by a decrease in unin-
tentional bequests. A longer life-span yields smaller unintentional bequests and thus lowers the
level of the young agents’ wealth. This implies a negative income eﬀect on investment in capital
1 John and Pecchenino (1994), John et al.(1995), and Jouvet et al.(1997) analyze optimal allocation of
capital and the environment.Howarth and Norgaard (1990), Howarth (1991) and Mourmouras (1993) discuss
intergenerational equity.Howarth and Norgaard (1992) and Howarth (1998) analyze climate change.Mour-
mouras (1991), M¨ aler (1994), Guruswamy Babu et al.(1997), and Krautkraemer and Batina (1999) focus on
intergenerational allocation of environmental resources.Ollikainen (1998) and Amacher et al.(1999) consider
timber bequests problems.
2 John et al.(1995) develop a model with environmental externalities and population growth.They show that
a higher population growth rate lowers environmental quality per capita but could raise the aggregate quality
of the environment.In contrast to them, we focus on aging while keeping population growth rate constant, and
achieve diﬀerent results and implications from theirs.
1and the environment. A positive aspect of aging is captured by more investment in capital and
the environment in preparation for longer life expectancy.
We ﬁrst show that an annuity market plays an important role in determining the eﬀects
of aging on economic growth and the environment. In the case of a perfect annuity, agents
annuitise all their wealth and bequeath nothing to their heirs. A perfect annuitisation eliminates
the negative income eﬀect of aging through unintentional bequests. Hence, aging is beneﬁcial
to economic growth and the environment under a certain condition. In the case of an imperfect
annuity where there are some unintentional bequests, aging leads to a decrease in unintentional
bequests, which implies a negative income eﬀect on growth and the environment. Since there are
two competing eﬀects of aging under imperfect annuity, greater longevity leads to either higher
or lower levels of capital and environmental quality.
Second, we show that higher annuitisation rate yields lower levels of capital and environmental
quality. An increase in annuitisation rate leads to the fall of unintentional bequests, thereby
implying a negative income eﬀect on capital and the environment. The zero annuitisation rate
is the best way to obtain higher capital and environmental quality given the longevity of agents.
We ﬁnally consider the eﬀects of aging in the case of zero annuitisation rate, and show that aging
may be beneﬁcial to growth and the environment under a certain condition.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we develop the model. In Section 3,
we show the suﬃcient conditions for the existence, uniqueness, and stability of the equilibrium.
In Section 4, we analyze the eﬀects of aging on economic growth and the environment. Section
5 contains our conclusion.
22 The Model
Consider a two-period overlapping generations model in which a continuum of agents is born.
The population of newly born agents is normalized to one.3 Each agent lives for two periods,
youth and old age, at maximum, but may die at the end of youth. Let p ∈ (0,1) be the probability
that the agent lives for two periods. In other words, p indicates the longevity of agents. The




t is the consumption by an agent of generation t during youth, c2
t+1 is the consumption
by an agent of generation t during old age, Et is an index for the quality of the environment in
period t, and Et+1 is an index for the quality of the environment in period t +1 .4,5 Following
the literature of population aging, an increase in p implies aging in the model (see, for example,
Ehrlich and Lui (1991) and Pecchenino and Pollard (1997)).
There is one private good and one public good, namely, the environment. Each agent is
endowed with one unit of labor in youth and nothing in old age. The agent inelastically supplies
the labor to the ﬁrms (deﬁned below) and obtains wages in youth.
The environment is assumed to be a public good that is reduced by aggregate consumption
but that can be improved by maintenance investment. We express this mechanism as the formula:
Et+1 = Et + b(E





where En > 0 is the natural environmental quality in absence of human intervention, b ∈ [0,1]
measures the speed of the autonomous change in environmental quality, β>0 is a parameter
of consumption externalities, c1
t + pc2
t is an aggregate consumption in period t, γ > 0i sa
3 We make abstraction from a free rider problem within a generation in order to focus our attention on
intergenerational externalities.
4 The superscript “1” means young and “2” means old.The subscript “ t” means period t.
5 This speciﬁcation of the utility function has the advantage of rendering our current analytic objects tractable.
In Section 4, we will evaluate how the speciﬁcation aﬀects our results.
3parameter that represents the technology for environmental maintenance, and mt is an aggregate
maintenance investment in period t.6 Note that βpc2
t is an intergenerational externality from
generation t−1 to generation t. This simple formulation is based on John and Pecchenino (1994)
and John et al. (1995).7
Following Pecchenino and Pollard (1997), we consider a situation in which actuarially fair
contracts are unavailable on the private market.8 The government overcomes this market failure
by establishing a market in actuarially fair annuity contracts. The government controls access
to this market so that each agent can only buy an annuity up to a ∈ (0,1] percent of his savings.
Since agents without bequests motives would prefer to annuitise all their wealth, they annuitise
their wealth up to this limit.9 Unannuitised wealth is transferred to their heirs as unintentional
bequests if the agent dies. Under this framework, an agent born in period t divides wage wt and
unintentional bequests Bt into savings st, consumption c1
t, and maintenance investment mt when
young and consumes (Rt+1 + µt+1)st when old, where Rt+1 is the gross return rate on savings
and µt+1 is the excess returns on annuities.
An agent in generation t takes as given the wage, wt, bequests, Bt, the return on savings,
Rt+1, the excess return on annuities, µt+1, environmental quality in period t, Et, the aggregate
6 Since the number of young agents is one in each period, a per capita consumption of young agents in period
t, c1
t, is equal to their aggregate consumption.On the other hand, aggregate consumption of old agents in period
t is pc2
t since the number of old agents is p.
7 Our formulation of the environmental equation diﬀers from John and Pecchenino (1994) and John et al.
(1995) on the following point.They deﬁne E as an index that can take on positive and negative values.A value
of zero is the quality of the environment in absence of human intervention.On the other hand, we assume that
the index takes on only positive values and En > 0 is the natural environmental quality in absence of human
intervention.
8 For example, in Japan, there are few means to make reverse mortgage contracts.Wealth such as land or
residence is often bequeathed to heirs unintentionally.This indicates the diﬃculty of actuarially fair contracts
on the private market.
9 In addition to this voluntary plan, Pecchenino and Pollard (1997) consider another plan: the mandatory
plan.Under this plan, each agent must place a part of his ﬁxed amount of income in an annuity.In this paper, we
adopt the voluntary plan and make clear the diﬀerence between a perfect annuity (a = 1) case and an imperfect
annuity (a<1) case.
4consumption of old agents in generation t−1,p c 2
t, and the maximum percentage of savings that












t + mt = wt + Bt, (1)
c
2
t+1 =( Rt+1 + µt+1)st, (2)








t ≥ 0,s t ≥ 0.
Throughout this paper, we focus on the case of positive maintenance, m>0.11 The ﬁrst-order
conditions of the utility maximization are (1) - (3) and
1/c
1
t =( β + γ)p/Et+1, (4)
(Rt+1 + µt+1)/c
2
t+1 = γ/Et+1. (5)
Taking c2
t,E t,w t,R t+1, and µt+1 as given, these ﬁve equations characterize the allocation
{c1
t,c 2
t+1,E t+1,m t,s t} which is the outcome of the utility maximization. (4) states that an in-
dividual chooses consumption when young to equate the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption in youth and environmental quality in old age to the marginal rate of transforma-
tion, β+γ. At the utility maximum, a decrease in utility due to falling consumption during youth
10 We can interpret the problem alternatively to mean that a short-lived government chooses an environmental
tax, mt, to maximize utility of generation t.
11 Suppose that an initial quality of the environment E1 is suﬃciently high and the initial capital stock k1
is suﬃciently low.Then, successive generations beginning with generation 1 will choose not to invest in the
environment, since they do not ﬁnd maintenance worthwhile.Hence, capital accumulation occurs, whereas the
quality of the environment decreases continuously in the future because of both the accumulation of consumption
externalities and the lack of maintenance investment.At some period t, agents born in this period will ﬁnd it
worthwhile to invest in the environment.The equilibrium path of generations with positive maintenance may
display capital accumulation and improvement in the quality of the environment into the future.Thus, we focus
on the equilibrium sequence with positive maintenance.See John and Pecchenino (1994) for a detailed analysis
of the equilibrium path including zero maintenance.
5is equal to an increase in utility due to the sum of an increase in maintenance eﬀort, γ, and a
decrease in a consumption externality, β. (5) states that an individual chooses savings to equate
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in old age and environmental quality
in old age to the marginal rate of transformation, γ/(Rt+1 + µt+1). At the utility maximum,
a decrease in utility due to falling consumption during old age, (Rt+1 + µt+1), is equal to an
increase in utility due to an increase in maintenance eﬀort, γ.
If an agent dies at the end of his youth, his unannuitised wealth is distributed to his heirs as
the unintentional bequest, Bt :
Bt =( 1− a)(1 − p)Rtst−1, (6)
where 1 − a is the share of wealth not annuitised, 1 − p is the percentage of agents who die at
the end of their youth period, and Rtst−1 is the gross return from savings. On the other hand,
annuitised wealth of those who die, a(1 − p)Rtst−1, is distributed to the agents who are alive in
old age. Thus, pµtst−1 = a(1 − p)Rtst−1, or
µt = a(1 − p)Rt/p. (7)
The structure of production is based on Pecchenino and Pollard (1997). The ﬁrms are
perfectly competitive proﬁt maximizers that produce output using the production function
Yt = AtKt
αLt
1−α,α∈ (0,1).K t is the capital stock in period t, Lt is employment in period
t, and At > 0 is a productivity scalar. We assume full depreciation of capital. The production
function can be written in the intensive form yt = Atkt
α where yt is the output-labor ratio and
kt is the capital-labor ratio. Assume, because of external eﬀects of aggregate capital on pro-
ductivity as discussed in Romer (1986), that At = AKt
η where A>0 and η>0 are constant
parameters. Therefore, the aggregate capital stock, Kt, enters the technology as a constant from
6the perspective of current producers.12
Taking as given wages (wt), rental rates (ρt), and the productivity scalar (At), each ﬁrm
chooses labor (Lt) and capital (Kt) to maximize its proﬁt. Thus, the ﬁrst-order conditions are
wt = At(1 − α)kt





where (8) and (9) state that the ﬁrm hires labor and capital until the marginal products equal





Because of the assumptions of a constant returns production technology and inelastic labor
supply, (8) and (9) also deﬁne factor markets clearing.
The economy starts at t =1 . In this period, there are both young agents in generation 1 and
initial old agents in generation 0. Each agent in generation 0 is endowed with k1 units of capital,
earns the return R1k1, and consumes it. We assume that the measure of the initial old agents is
p. The utility of an agent in generation 0 is lnc2
1 +l nE1 where E1 is given.
3 Laissez-faire Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize a laissez-faire equilibrium. A laissez-faire equilibrium with posi-
tive maintenance is a sequence {c1
t,c2
t,Et,mt,st,kt,wt,ρt,Rt,µt,Bt}∞
t=1 with the initial condition
{k1,E 1} such that, in each period t =1 ,2,... : (i) agents maximize utility; (ii) ﬁrms maximize
proﬁts; and (iii) markets clear.
12 An alternative way of introducing an externality is to assume that At = AK
η
t−1, as in John and Pecchenino
(1994): the capital stock of the previous period aﬀects the current output.This form makes the analysis quite
complicated, so we adopt the form, At = AK
η
t .
73.1 Characterization of the Equilibrium
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the utility maximization are (1) - (5), and the ﬁrst-order conditions
of proﬁt maximization are (8) and (9). A market clearing condition for capital is stLt = Kt+1,
which says that the total savings by young agents in generation t, stLt, must equal their own
addition to the future stock of capital, Kt+1. Since Lt = 1 for all t, this condition is rewritten as
st = kt+1. (10)
Since the market for capital is competitive, we have an arbitrage condition of the form:
Rt+1 = ρt+1. (11)
Given {k1,E 1}, the sequence {c1
t,c2
t,Et,mt,st,kt,wt,ρt,Rt,µt,Bt}∞
t=1 is characterized by (1)
- (11). Summarizing these equations, we have
Et+1 = γkt+1, (12)




















t +( 1− a)(1 − p)αAk
α+η





which characterize the equilibrium path {kt,Et} given the initial conditions {k1,E 1}. (12) is a
rewrite of (5), and (13) is a rewrite of (3).
Substituting (12) into (13) leads to




















t +( 1− a)(1 − p)αAk
α+η




















ξ ≡− βp(1 + a(1 − p)/p)αA + γA{(1 − α)+( 1− a)(1 − p)α}.
We assume ξ>0 in the following analysis.13 (15) characterizes the laissez-faire equilibrium
path with positive maintenance {kt}∞
t=1 with the initial condition k1 > 0.
A steady state equilibrium is a sequence {kt} with kt = kt+1 = ¯ k. Since Et+1 = γkt+1 holds,
the quality of the environment also remains constant along the steady state equilibrium path. A
nontrivial steady state equilibrium is a sequence {kt} with kt = k>0.
3.2 Existence, Uniqueness, and Stability of the Equilibrium
In this subsection, we analyze the existence, uniqueness, and stability of the steady state equi-
librium. In preparation for the analysis, we deﬁne
E
∗ ≡
(α + η − 1)
bξ1/(α+η−1)





Then, we obtain the following results.
Proposition 1: (i) Suppose that α + η<1. There exists a unique and stable nontrivial steady
state equilibrium.
(ii) Suppose that α+η =1 . There exists a unique and stable nontrivial steady state equilibrium
if {γ(1 − b)+ξ}/γ(2 + 1/p) < 1. There exists no nontrivial steady state equilibrium if
{γ(1 − b)+ξ}/γ(2 + 1/p) ≥ 1.
(iii) Suppose that α + η>1. There exist two nontrivial steady state equilibria if En <E ∗; the
one with lower k is stable and the other with higher k is unstable. There exists a unique
13 As we will see below, the equilibrium path may display monotone convergence to the steady state if ξ>0.
On the other hand, it may display cyclical behavior if ξ ≤ 0. Since our analysis is restricted to the stable steady
state, we assume ξ>0.
9and unstable nontrivial steady state equilibrium if En = E∗. There exists no nontrivial
steady state equilibrium if En >E ∗.
Proof: (i) When α+η<1 holds, the function G(·) is strictly increasing and strictly concave
with G(0) = bEn/γ(2 + 1/p) > 0, limk→∞G(k)=∞, limk→0 G (k)=∞, and limk→∞G (k)=
(1−b)/(2 +1/p) < 1. In the kt −kt+1 space where the horizontal axis is kt and the vertical axis
is kt+1, the graph of G(·) cuts the 45o line once from above since limk→∞G (k) < 1 (see Figure
3.1).








The graph of G(·) cuts the 45o line once from above if the slope of G(·) is less than one, i.e.,
{γ(1−b)+ξ}/γ(2+1/p) < 1 (see Figure 3.2). On the other hand, the graph of G(·) never cuts
the 45o line if the slope of G(·) is equal to or greater than one, i.e., {γ(1−b)+ξ}/γ(2+1/p) ≥ 1.
(iii) When α + η>1, the function G(·) is strictly increasing and strictly convex as shown in
Figure 3.3. Thus the number of steady state equilibria is two, one, or none.
Let us deﬁne ˆ k satisfying dG(ˆ k)/dk =1 . Then, ˆ k is
ˆ k = {γ(1 + 1/p + b)/(α + η)ξ}
1/(α+η−1) .
If G(ˆ k) < ˆ k, there exist two nontrivial steady state equilibria. If G(ˆ k)=ˆ k, there exists
one nontrivial steady state equilibrium. If G(ˆ k) > ˆ k, there exists no nontrivial steady state
equilibrium. The relation G(ˆ k)  ˆ k is reduced to bEn  (α + η − 1)ξ{γ(1 + 1/p + b)/(α +
η)ξ}(α+η)/(α+η−1). Q.E.D.
In case of α + η<1, for any initial condition of k1 > 0, the economy displays a monotone
convergence to the unique nontrivial steady state equilibrium.
10In case of α + η =1 , for any initial condition of k1 > 0, the economy displays a monotone
convergence to the nontrivial unique steady state equilibrium if {γ(1 − b)+ξ}/γ(2 + 1/p) < 1.















To interpret this condition, we rearrange (14) and set α + η =1 :


















We can interpret the suﬃcient condition by comparing (16) and (17). The ﬁrst term in the
right-hand side of (16), −γb, is the negative eﬀect of the autonomous decrease in environmental
quality. The second term, −βγ/(β + γ)p, is the negative consumption externality of young
agents. The third term, −βp(1 + a(1 − p)/p)αA, is the negative consumption externality of old
agents. The fourth term, γ(1−α)A, is the positive income eﬀect, which implies that the increase
in wages enhances maintenance investment. The ﬁfth term, γ(1 − a)(1 − p)αA, is the positive
income eﬀect of unintentional bequests, which implies that the increase in bequests enhances
maintenance activity. The sixth term, −γ, is the substitution eﬀect of savings for maintenance
investment; the decrease in one unit of maintenance investment caused by the increase in one
unit of savings implies the decrease of γ units of the environmental quality. The seventh term,
−γ2/(β + γ)p, is the negative substitution eﬀect of consumption in youth for environmental
maintenance. If the sum of the positive eﬀects is smaller than the sum of the negative eﬀects,
then the economy displays the convergence to the unique and nontrivial steady state equilibrium.
In case of α+η>1, there are two steady state equilibria if En <E ∗: the one with lower per
capita capital, kL, and the other with higher per capita capital kH(>k L). When k1 ∈ (0,k H),
11the economy displays the monotone convergence to the steady state with kL. When k1 = kH,
the equilibrium path continues to stay at the steady state with k = kH. When k1 >k H, the
economy displays the divergence: capital and environmental quality continues to increase over
time. If En >E ∗, capital and environmental quality grow inﬁnitely.
4 The Eﬀects of Aging on Economic Growth and the En-
vironment
In this section, we undertake comparative static analysis at the stable steady state equilibrium
and then show the eﬀects of aging on growth and the environment.
Proposition 2: (i) If wealth is totally annuitised (a =1 ) , greater longevity leads to higher
steady state levels of capital and environmental quality.
(ii) If wealth is not totally annuitised (a<1), greater longevity leads to either higher or lower
steady state levels of capital and environmental quality.





γ(1 − b)k + bEn + ξk
α+η
γp2(2 + 1/p)2 +





The inequality 1−G (k) > 0 holds at the stable steady state (see Figures 3.1-3.3). When




{γ(1 − b)k + bEn + ξk
α+η
}
{1 − G (k)}γp2(2 + 1/p)2 > 0.
Since E is positively related to k (E = γk), we have ∂E/∂p > 0. When a<1, there
is a negative eﬀect of aging as shown in the second term on the right-hand side of (18).
12Therefore, a higher p leads to either higher or lower capital and environmental quality.
Q.E.D.
If wealth is totally annuitised, aging is beneﬁcial to growth and the environment. Greater
longevity heightens the incentive to invest in saving and the environment, thereby increasing
capital accumulation and improving environmental quality; there is only this positive eﬀect. If
wealth is not totally annuitised, aging reduces unintentional bequests. This is a negative income
eﬀect that counteracts the positive eﬀect. Therefore, aging may be either harmful or beneﬁcial
to growth and the environment.
We should notice that, in our model, there is no substitution eﬀect of aging since we assume a
log-linear utility function. If we adopt the general form of a utility function, saving depends on the
return Rt+1 +µt+1 so that aging has a substitution eﬀect. If wealth is totally annuitised, greater
longevity leads to the lower return to saving since the return is decreasing in p : Rt+1 + µt+1 =
Rt+1 +( 1− p)Rt+1/p = Rt+1/p. If wealth is not totally annuitised, greater longevity leads to
the lower return to the annuity: µt+1 = a(1 − p)Rt+1/p. Therefore, a decrease in return aﬀects
the saving if we adopt the general form of the utility function. In particular, under the gross
substitutability assumption, greater longevity leads to lower rate of return and thus a smaller
amount of saving (see Azariadis (1993), Chapter 13); there appears to be an additional negative
substitution eﬀect that counteracts the positive eﬀect. Therefore, even if the wealth is totally
annuitised (a = 1), aging may be harmful to growth and the environment.14
The results in Proposition 2 imply that the annuitisation is a key factor in evaluating the
eﬀects of aging. Therefore, we next consider the eﬀects of an increase in annuitisation rate on
growth and the environment.
14 We would like to thank an anoymous referee for pointing this out.
13Proposition 3: The higher degree of annuitisation leads to lower levels of capital and the
environment.





−(β + γ)(1 − p)αAk
α+η
(1 − G (k))γ(2 + 1/p)
< 0.
Since E = γk holds, we also have ∂E/∂a <0. Q.E.D.
An increase in annuitisation rate leads to the fall of unintentional bequests, implying a nega-
tive income eﬀect on the young. Agents respond to this eﬀect by reducing saving, consumption in
youth, and maintenance investment. A higher annuitisation rate leads to lower levels of capital
and environmental quality. Therefore, setting a = 0 is the best way to obtain higher capital and
environmental quality given the longevity p.
We ﬁnally consider the eﬀects of aging when the wealth is not annuitised: a =0 .
Proposition 4: Suppose that a =0:wealth is not annuitised. Greater longevity leads to higher
levels of capital and environmental quality if γ − 2αp(1 + p)(β + γ) ≥ 0.










Since the denominator in the right-hand side is positive and the ﬁrst and the second terms
of the numerator in the right-hand side are positive, ∂k/∂p > 0 if the third term of the
numerator in the right-hand side, i.e., γ − 2αp(1 + p)(β + γ) ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
14When wealth is not annuitised, there are two competing eﬀects of aging as shown in Propo-
sition 2 (ii). First is a positive eﬀect: greater longevity heightens the incentive to save and
invest in the environment. Second is a negative eﬀect: greater longevity decreases unintentional
bequests. The suﬃcient condition implies that aging is beneﬁcial to growth and the environment
even if the wealth is not annuitised; the positive eﬀect of aging overcomes the negative one if the
original longevity (p) is low, the degree of the negative eﬀect of consumption on the environment
(β) is low, and the capital share (α)i sl o w . 15
Many industrialized countries are likely to violate the suﬃcient condition in Proposition 4
since the longevity in those countries is already high. The longer life expectancy toward the future
would result in lower levels of capital and environmental quality. They must lower the degree
of the negative eﬀect of consumption (β) in order to satisfy the suﬃcient condition. Examples
are the wide spread of a recycling scheme and the development of the new technology that
controls engine emissions. These eﬀorts lead the industrialized countries to achieve sustainable
development in an aging economy.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed an overlapping generations model with uncertain lifetimes and
environmental externalities. In particular, we have considered a situation in which actuarially
fair contracts are unavailable on the private market, and in which the government overcomes
this market failure by establishing a market in actuarially fair annuity contracts. Under this
framework, we have analyzed the eﬀects of aging on growth and the environment.
Our main ﬁnding is that annuitisation plays an important role in determining the eﬀects of
aging on growth and the environment. In case of perfect annuitisation, the higher longevity
15 The eﬀect of γ is ambiguous since γ has two competing eﬀects on the suﬃcient condition.
15yields more accumulation of capital and the environment under a certain condition. On the
other hand, in case of imperfect annuitisation, aging results in a decrease in unintentional be-
quests since agents who die at the end of youth transfer part of their wealth to their heirs as
unintentional bequests. Aging has a negative income eﬀect on economic growth and the envi-
ronment which counteracts a positive eﬀect of aging. In addition, when the annuitisation rate
is zero, aging could be beneﬁcial to growth and the environment if the original longevity is low
and the degree of the negative eﬀect of consumption is low; that is, setting annuitisation rate
is zero is optimal in view of utility maximization under a certain condition. This result implies
that many industrialized countries with high longevity must lower the degree of consumption
externality and set annuitisation rate as zero in order to achieve sustainable development in an
aging economy.
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